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ABSTRACT
In this paper I consider some of the most promi-
nent philosophical challenges to the viability of 
Chomskyan linguistics. The challenges in ques-
tion are generated by the work of Quine, Kripke 
and Crispin Wright. I respond to these challenges 
by developing an account of rule representation 
that appeals to the lower level causal workings 
of a particular component of the mind-brain 
that plays a fundamental role in grounding our 
linguistic capacities. This account draws upon 
various elements of Chomsky’s core commit-
ments. These include his modularity thesis, his 
view that the language faculty owes its status as 
such to its relations to other in-head systems, his 
general conception of the relationship between 
the mind and the brain, and his nativist concep-
tion of language acquisition.
Key words: Chomsky, modularity, representa-
tion, nativism, ceteris paribus laws.
Introduction
Despite its massive influence within 
linguistics and cognitive science many 
philosophers have been exercised by the 
worry that there is something deeply 
problematic with Chomskyan linguis-
tics. In this paper I will examine and 
attempt to answer what are to my mind  
three of the most interesting and impor-
tant philosophical objections to Chom-
sky’s work. The objections in question 
are due, respectively, to W.V. Quine, Saul 
Kripke and Crispin Wright. My response 
rests upon an account of rule represen-
tation that places substantial emphasis 
on the causal factors underlying our lin-
guistic abilities and is motivated by the 
scientific ambitions of Chomsky’s work, 
his commitment to the modularity thesis 
and his nativist conception of language 
acquisition.
  Examples of prominent philosophers who have di-
rectly taken issue with Chomsky’s core commitments 
include Putnam 967, Baker & Hacker 984, Searle 
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1. Quine and Kripke’s objections
According to Chomsky rules are central to an individual’s language: when an individual 
knows a language there are a whole battery of rules that constitute her language, rules 
that she knows and draws upon in language production and comprehension.2 Chom-
sky characterises the knowledge in question is a species of propositional rather than 
ability knowledge and it is typically unconscious or tacit (Chomsky 980). There is 
nothing more to an individual’s language than the rules that she knows. Consequently, 
in seeking to describe an individual’s language and explain its acquisition, the linguist is 
engaging in cognitive psychology.3 for such an engagement in cognitive psychology to 
have any point there would have to be a fact of the matter as to what rules were known 
by the individual and thus constituted her language. What Quine and Kripke’s argu-
ments suggest is that there is no such fact of the matter so that Chomsky is searching 
for facts where there are no facts to be found. I will examine these arguments in turn 
beginning with Quine’s. 
Quine’s argument runs as follows (Quine 972). There are cases where it makes perfect 
sense to attribute to an individual speaker of a given language knowledge of a particular 
body of rules (a grammar) and identify those rules as the ones that she draws upon in 
language production and comprehension. Consider two groups of Danish children who 
have learnt English in different ways. Members of the first group have been taught tra-
ditional schoolroom grammar which they explicitly consult in constructing sentences 
of English. Members of the second group have been taught Jesperson’s grammar which 
they explicitly consult in constructing sentences of English. These rival grammars are 
extensionally equivalent and equally fit the linguistic behaviour and dispositions of all 
the children. Nevertheless, the first group of children are guided by one grammar con-
sisting of a particular body of rules and the second are guided by another grammar 
consisting of a different body of rules. Hence, it is perfectly legitimate to prefer one 
account of the grammar of the first group and a different account of that of the second 
group. But, argues Quine, in the case of a typical child whose first language is English, 
there is no such case of being guided by a particular grammar. Such speakers are un-
able to state any rules of the language that they speak; at best a particular grammar fits 
the linguistic behaviour and dispositions of the child. But there will always be distinct 
grammars that equally fit their linguistic behaviour and dispositions, grammars that 
2  With the advent of government and binding theory and the development of the principles and parameters ap-
proach rules were replaced by principles in Chomsky’s theorising (Chomsky 98; Chomsky 986). This is because, 
for Chomsky, talk of rules carries with it connotations of specificity to particular languages. If knowing a language 
involved representing rules in this sense then it would be difficult to see how a child could acquire knowledge of her 
language. Hence, a linguistic theory that talked of rules would not meet the condition of explanatory adequacy, that 
is, the condition of explaining language acquisition. for the purposes of this paper nothing hangs on this change as 
principles are a species of rules, namely, rules of great generality that Pinker dubs ‘super rules’ (Pinker 994). Accord-
ingly, unless otherwise indicated, I will use the term ‘rule’ to cover both rules and principles in Chomsky’s narrow 
sense of those terms.
3  for an early and classic statement of this psychologistic view of linguistics, Chomsky 965, Ch. .
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are extensionally equivalent. There can be no grounds for saying of any one of these 
grammars that it is the grammar of the child’s language or that the linguistic theory that 
attributes this grammar to the child is the correct theory of the child’s language. If this 
is right then there are clearly going to be rival accounts of the rules of any individual’s 
language that are equally legitimate even when all the potentially relevant facts about 
the individual are known. Consequently, there is no fact of the matter as to what par-
ticular body of rules belongs to a typical individual’s language, as to what grammar is 
true of her language.
The second argument is due to Kripke and can be described as follows (Kripke 982). 
Suppose that an individual intends to use the symbol ‘+’ to denote a particular math-
ematical function and so intends her use of this symbol to be governed by a rule cor-
responding to that function. The rule is such that she should answer any question of the 
form ‘what is x + y?’ by specifying the number that is the value of the function for the 
arguments x, y. At any point in her history she will have applied this rule only finitely 
many times. Moreover, being a finite creature, she will be disposed to give answers to 
only finitely many questions of this form. Suppose that up to a particular point in time 
she has always given the sum of x and y in answer to every problem of the form ‘what 
is x + y?’ that she has encountered but that none of these problems were such that the 
value of either x or y was greater than 56. She then encounters the problem ‘what is 57 
+ 68?’ and answers ‘25.’ Is that answer correct? Is it in accord with the rule that she 
intended to follow in her use of ‘+’? If the rule is the addition rule (that is the rule such 
that one should give the sum of x and y as the answer) then her answer is correct. But 
there will be some other rule (the quaddition rule) that equally fits her past behaviour 
but requires her to give the answer ‘5’ to this new problem. Which of these two rules 
has she been intending to follow? Which of them is the rule governing her use of ‘+’? 
According to Kripke, there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not she intended to 
follow the addition rule; her past behaviour and conscious mental states are consistent 
with an intention to follow this rule but are equally consistent with an intention to fol-
low some other rule. Appeal to her dispositions won’t settle the issue. Her dispositions 
might serve to undermine the claim that she intended to follow the quaddition rule. 
But as her dispositions are finite and the demands of rules such as the addition rule are 
infinite, both the addition rule and some distinct quaddition like rule will equally fit 
her dispositions.
Although Kripke focuses on a mathematical example, one can easily envisage an ana-
logue involving the kinds of rules that Chomsky is concerned with. Suppose that a lin-
guist claims that a particular rule is (tacitly or non-consciously) known by a particular 
language user and so belongs to her language. given the infinite demands of such rules 
(that is, given the fact that they typically have implications for the grammaticality or 
otherwise of infinitely many distinct combinations of words of the language to which 
they belong) if the postulated rule fits the language user’s history of behaviour, her 
conscious mental states and her dispositions to behave, then so will some other non-
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equivalent rule. So there can there be no fact of the matter as to whether the postulated 
rule rather than some other competing rule is known by the language user and so be-
longs to her language.
Chomsky has engaged with both Quine and Kripke suggesting that he takes their argu-
ments very seriously indeed. However, I do not think that Chomsky’s responses directly 
confront the arguments as I have described them. With respect to Quine, his tendency 
has been to interpret Quine as doing little more than making the point that linguistic 
theories are underdetermined by observable evidence. Chomsky is willing to concede 
this point but thinks that this does nothing to undermine linguistics as scientific theo-
ries are generally underdetermined in this way.4 I think that this is to misunderstand 
Quine’s argument. for, he is not making a point about the epistemic plight of the lin-
guist, the point that she does not have conclusive evidence as to which of the competing 
linguistic theories is true, as to which collection of rules belongs to the language of the 
target individuals. Rather, his point is that there is no fact of the matter as to which of 
the competing theories is true, as to which collection of rules belongs to the language 
of the target individuals. Thus, Quine’s argument bears more in common with his thesis 
of the indeterminacy of radical translation (Quine 960) than it does with the so called 
Duhem-Quine thesis (Duhem 982; Quine 95). 
With respect to Kripke, Chomsky’s response focuses not so much on the argument for 
rule scepticism but on the attempted sceptical solution to the problem of rule follow-
ing, a solution that places substantial emphasis on the role of the community.5 Conse-
quently a direct response to Quine and Kripke’s objections is needed and in the remain-
der of this paper I shall attempt to develop such a response.
An important point to be made concerns Chomsky’s talk of knowledge. He frequently 
says that the rules belonging to an individual’s language are items of (propositional) 
knowledge, albeit unconscious or tacit knowledge. However, in the face of philosophi-
cal objections he is prepared to drop talk of knowledge, for example, by replacing it 
with talk of cognizing rules. Accordingly, I don’t think that Chomsky need be commit-
ted to the claim that we know rules of the kind that he postulates in the sense of the 
term ‘know’ that philosophers normally operate with. Rather, his commitment is that 
determinate rules are represented within us where representing a particular rule is a 
psychological state that can differ in salient respects from a state of knowledge.6 Thus, 
the rules that constitute an individual’s language are represented within her mind but 
she is not typically conscious of these rules. Consequently, the task becomes that of 
4  for example, see Chomsky 2000, Ch 4.
5  See Chomsky 986, Ch 4.
6  Here is a typical expression of this view: “Evidently, each language is the interplay of two factors: the initial state 
and the course of experience. We can think of the initial state as a ‘language acquisition device’ that takes experi-
ence as input and gives the language as an ‘output’ – an ‘output’ that is internally represented in the mind/brain”, 
Chomsky 2000, p 4.
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giving an account of how a determinate rule can be represented within an individual’s 
mind that survives Quine and Kripke’s objections. 
It might be thought that producing such an account of rule representation would re-
quire producing a naturalistic theory that appealed only to scientifically respectable 
properties that resided at a level lower than the psychological or linguistic.7 Even as-
suming that there would have to be a true naturalistic theory of this kind for a Chom-
skyan linguistic theory to be true,8 it is not incumbent on us to produce such a theory. 
This has to do with Chomsky’s repeated insistence that linguistics should be treated 
no less charitably than any other science. To be guilty of methodological dualism is 
to operate with double standards by making demands of one science (linguistics, in 
particular) that one doesn’t make of other more established sciences. Now very few 
scientists, be they geologists, biologists, or whatever, would be in a position to present a 
relevant naturalistic theory in order to defend their scientific claims but no-one would 
dream of questioning the legitimacy of their endeavours for that reason alone. Thus, an 
inability to present a naturalist theory in the case of linguistics does not in and of itself 
undermine the scientific legitimacy of delivering a particular theory as to what rules 
are represented in an individual’s mind/brain.
The most significant consequence of not needing a naturalistic theory is that we can 
legitimately appeal to psychological and linguistic phenomena in responding to the 
challenge of Quine and Kripke so long as the reality of those phenomena is not a matter 
of controversy. Indeed, there are many psychological and linguistic facts the reality of 
which most philosophers would concede. Here are some examples. Most human indi-
viduals have mastery of a language and know the meanings and sounds of many words 
and expressions of the language that they have mastered. Individuals routinely make 
correct judgements as to the grammaticality of expressions composed of words of their 
language. There are syntactic generalisations true of languages that their speakers typi-
cally satisfy: for, example, in English the head of a phrase comes before its complement 
and speakers of English typically produce sentences that satisfy this generalisation and 
reject as ungrammatical sentences that they encounter that do not.9
7  Such a theory would be the analogue of the naturalistic theories of content that Jerry fodor has attempted to 
develop (fodor 987; fodor 990).
8  This is an assumption that I doubt that Chomsky would endorse given his opposition to physicalism. Chomsky 
(Chomsky 2000) argues that physicalism is an incoherent doctrine as a result of Newton’s destruction of Cartesian 
contact mechanics. for discussion see Lycan 2003, Strawson 2003, Poland 2003 and Chomsky 2003.
9  To endorse the view that it is legitimate to appeal to non-controversial linguistic and psychological phenomena 
might be seen as problematic in the context of the discussion of Kripke as his scepticism is intended to range so 
far as to undermine the idea that there are any determinate facts concerning what we mean by our words. My 
answer to this worry is to point out that my concern is specifically with the viability of linguistic theories that 
many philosophers who are not generally sceptically inclined find problematic. This entitles me to take for granted 
phenomena the reality of which they would not ordinarily be inclined to question, such as those described above. 
This might involve engaging with an argument that isn’t quite what Kripke had in mind. Hence, it might be more 
accurate to talk of an objection inspired or suggested by Kripke rather than Kripke’s objection. However, for ease 
of exposition I shall continue to talk of Kripke’s objection. The justification for not directly engaging with Kripke’s 
radical scepticism is that if such scepticism is a problem for the Chomskyan then it is a problem for everyone. If 
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2. The goal of linguistics
What is needed then is an account of how a determinate rule of the kind that Chomsky 
postulates could be represented in the mind/brain of an individual. I don’t think that 
Chomsky has fully developed such an account. In response to the related issue as to 
what it is for a rule to be psychologically real Chomsky has tended to reply that it is just 
a matter of the truth of the linguistic theory that attributes the rule.0 I sympathise with 
those psychologists and philosophers who complain that Chomsky might do more 
to tell us what is involved in a linguistic theory’s being true or how rules could be rep-
resented in the mind/brain. However, I do not think that the situation is hopeless and 
prominent elements of Chomsky’s output do provide suggestions that can be developed 
in such a way as to provide the required account of rule representation. To see this it is 
necessary to take a more detailed look at Chomsky’s core commitments.
from the Chomskyan perspective the goal of linguistics is to uncover the workings of 
the language faculty. The language faculty is a distinct component of the mind/brain 
that plays a fundamental role in knowing and acquiring language and is implicated 
in language production and comprehension. Chomsky (Chomsky 980) compares the 
language faculty to other components of the mind/brain such as the visual system and 
with organs of the body such as the heart and the liver (indeed, he sometimes calls 
the language faculty a mental organ). Taking these comparisons seriously suggests that 
Chomsky is committed to a modularity theory akin to that of fodor (fodor 983) ac-
cording to which the language faculty is a distinct causal mechanism located in the 
brain that plays a fundamental role in language processing.2 
Consider the heart, a distinct component of the body whose defining function is to 
pump blood around the body and so deliver oxygen to other organs. The heart couldn’t 
perform this function unless it was suitably connected to other organs. Something 
could be intrinsically just like my heart without being a heart because it was hooked up 
to other bodily organs in fundamentally different ways. Nevertheless, we can study the 
heart in relative isolation from other bodily organs seeking to discover how it works 
and so performs its defining function. Something similar is true of the language faculty 
as conceived by Chomsky. The language faculty interacts with other systems of the 
mind/brain such as thought, perception and articulatory systems and owes its status as 
a way were found of dealing with such a scepticism so as to vindicate our commonsense assumptions about lan-
guage and the mind, then that response could combined with the account of rule representation I shall develop to 
constitute a complete defence of Chomsky against Kripke’s radical scepticism. 
0  for example, Chomsky identifies a “claim for the psychological reality” of the posits of a particular linguistic 
theory with a claim for the “truth of a certain theory”. Chomsky 980, p. 9.
  for example, Pylyshyn 99 and Rey 2003a; Rey 2003b. 
2  This involves rejecting fodor’s (fodor 98; fodor 2000) own reading of Chomsky according to which his ver-
sion of the modularity thesis is not an architectural one but the idea that speakers of a language have a particular, 
largely innate, body of knowledge or beliefs specifically about language that they draw upon in language produc-
tion and comprehension. for an interesting discussion of fodor’s reading of Chomsky see Collins (Collins 2004). 
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the language faculty to its relations with those systems. Similarly, Chomsky describes 
an individual’s language as a state of her language faculty (and, thus, a state of her 
brain). This brain state would not be a language were it not for the connections that it 
bears to components of the mind/brain distinct from the language faculty.3
If the task of linguistics is to uncover the workings of the language faculty then the 
question arises as to the precise function of the language faculty. for Chomsky, when 
it has reached a mature state, the language faculty’s function is to generate expressions 
from the lexical items belonging to the individual’s language by means of the operations 
of merger and move.4 The expressions so generated have two components, a sound and 
a meaning. Thus, the language faculty works to effect a particular pairing of sounds and 
meanings. When the language faculty operates so as to produce an expression, that ex-
pression is an internal phenomenon that resides at the interface between the language 
faculty and related systems concerned with thought and articulation. In particular, the 
expression consists of a pair of representations: an Lf (Logical form) representation 
that resides at the interface with the thought system, and a Pf (Phonetic form) repre-
sentation that resides at the interface with the articulatory system. Chomsky sometimes 
describes such representations as instructions. for example, a Pf representation is an 
instruction to the articulatory system to produce a particular sound. Reflecting the 
above point that the language faculty is a language faculty (and its state a language) 
only insofar as it is appropriately related to other systems of the mind/brain, an internal 
phenomenon is an expression (a particular pairing of an Lf and a Pf representation) 
only insofar as it is appropriately related to other systems of the mind/brain. Such a 
relationship might involve having a particular causal impact on such systems so that, 
for example, a particular Lf representation owes its status as such because it causes the 
articulatory system to produce a particular sound.
Chomsky’s systematic use of the term ‘mind/brain’ and his comparison of the language 
faculty with bodily organs reflects a general view of the relationship between the mind 
and the brain that can be described in the following terms. The mind and the brain are 
not two distinct systems. To describe an individual’s mind is to describe her brain in 
mental terms; it is to describe her brain at a higher level of abstraction than the neuro-
scientist does. Alternatively, to describe the brain in neuroscientific terms is to describe 
the mind at a lower level of abstraction than the psychologist does. Thus, the language 
faculty is ultimately a component of the brain and the rules represented within it are 
somehow physically realised in the brain. Hence, “A person who speaks a language has 
developed a certain system of knowledge, represented somehow in the mind and, ulti-
mately, in the brain in some physical configuration” (Chomsky 988, p. 3). 
3  See Chomsky 2000, p. 27 for a particularly clear expression of such views.
4  Merger is the operation of concatenating lexical items and movement is the operation of moving an element of 
an expression from one place in the expression to another.
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So the task of linguistics is to uncover the way in which the language faculty, a system 
housed in the brain, generates expressions. If we combine this with the idea that engag-
ing in this task involves specifying a body of rules represented in the language faculty 
then the implication is as follows: the rules represented in an individual’s language 
faculty is a matter of the way in which that faculty generates the expressions of her 
language.
3. Rule representation
The claim that the rules represented in the language faculty is a matter of the way in 
which that faculty generates expressions suggests two things. first, that there are rules 
that fit the behaviour of the language faculty. In order for a particular rule to fit the be-
haviour of the language faculty that system must be capable of behaving in accord with 
the rule in question, say producing expressions permitted by the rule. Moreover, the 
language faculty must not be capable of behaving in conflict will the rule, for example, 
of producing an expression not permitted by the rule. 
Considered against the background of Chomsky’s views concerning the relationship 
between the mind and the brain, the second point has to do with how the expression 
generating behaviour is grounded by lower level processes. As the language faculty is a 
component of the brain whenever that faculty produces an expression a causal process 
will take place that can be described both in linguistic terms and in terms that reside at 
a level lower than the linguistic (for example, in neural terms). Describing the workings 
of an individual’s language faculty in linguistic terms involves describing the workings 
of a component of her brain at a higher level of abstraction than the neuroscientist 
does. In effect, the linguist’s task it to describe the workings of the brain in terms of 
its linguistic significance. Consequently, which linguistic descriptions are true will be 
bound up with, and constrained by, which lower level neural descriptions are true. 
What all this suggests is that for an individual’s language faculty to represent a rule not 
only must the rule fit its behaviour. But, in addition, all instances of behaviour covered 
by the rule that the system engages in must exhibit a salient similarity from the lower 
level perspective. In other words, there must be a common lower level causal process 
going on whenever the system behaves in accord with the rule. 
To see how this applies to the linguistic case consider the following example. A promi-
nent hypothesis within the principles and parameters approach that emerged in the 
980s is that it is a rule of English that the head of a phrase comes before its comple-
ment. Suppose that this rule is represented in the language faculty of English speakers. 
Then, whenever the language faculty of an English speaker produces an expression, it 
will consist of phrases where the head comes before its complement. In addition, all ex-
pressions will have this characteristic as the result of the workings of a common lower 
level causal process. To claim that the head first rule is represented in an individual’s 
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language faculty is therefore to make a substantial explanatory move. for it is to tell us 
that the expressions produced by her language faculty have a salient characteristic and 
it is to tell us, in abstract terms, how those expressions are generated and why they have 
that salient characteristic. 
The explanatory significance of the claim that the head first rule is represented can 
be seen by contrasting it with an alternative hypothesis. According to the alternative 
hypothesis, the individual has several distinct rules represented in her language faculty 
that together ensure that any expression produced will consist of phrases where the 
head comes before its complement. These rules include the rule that in a noun phrase 
the noun comes before its complement, the rule that in a verb phrase the verb comes 
before its complement, the rule that in a prepositional phrase the preposition comes 
before its complement, and so on. An implication of this hypothesis is that distinct 
lower level processes are implicated in the construction of different types of phrases so 
that there is no single, general explanation as to why heads precede their complements. 
Rather, that general feature of expressions is to be explained as a product of several 
distinct and independent lower level processes. Hence, the alternative hypothesis offers 
a contrasting account of the workings of the language faculty.
generalised, the idea is this. The task of linguistics is to explain how the language fac-
ulty works in generating expressions. The linguist does this by specifying a body of 
rules for generating expressions that are represented in the language faculty. Such an 
attribution of rules implies that those rules fit the language faculty’s expression gen-
erating behaviour and provides an abstract account of the lower level causal basis of 
this behaviour. This account is abstract because it does not tell us anything about the 
specific nature of this causal basis. for example, it does not provide any neural details of 
the workings of the language faculty. This leaves the way open for an incorporation of 
linguistics into neuroscience when these neural details are uncovered, something that 
Chomsky sees as the ultimate goal of linguistics. 
None of this implies that linguistics reduces to neuroscience for two reasons. first, we 
should expect the rules represented in the language faculty to be multiply realisable 
so that individuals whose brains were physically quite different could still share a lan-
guage. Second, because the language faculty’s status as such depends upon its relation-
ship to other subsystems of the mind/brain, in principle something could be just like 
the human language faculty from the neuroscientific perspective without representing 
any linguistic rules at all. This would be the case if the subsystem in question drove 
locomotion rather than being connected to modules concerned with thought and ar-
ticulation. 
In suggesting that the manner in which the language faculty represents rules should 
be seen as a species of representation that is to be understood in causal terms, I have 
committed myself to the idea that there is a complex two way relationship between the 
output of the language faculty (understood to include its effect on modules concerned 
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with thought and articulation) and its internal workings. On the one hand, the identity 
of the rules internal to the language faculty partly depends on properties of the expres-
sions that it produces that are independent of the precise workings of that faculty. That 
is to say, on properties that competing linguists could attribute to expressions whilst 
holding divergent views of the language faculty’s internal workings. for example, for 
the head first rule to be represented it is necessary that the language faculty gener-
ally produces expressions which consist of phrases where the head comes before its 
complement.5 On the other hand, some salient properties of expressions are directly 
determined by the workings of the language faculty so that it is necessary for the lan-
guage faculty to work in a particular way from the lower level perspective in order 
for expressions to have that property. To see this consider the following. Typically an 
expression will be the product of the application of more than one rule so that more 
than one distinct lower level process will have been involved in its generation. The 
fine-grained syntactic structure of the expression (as represented by a linguist’s tree 
diagram) will be an interaction effect of these lower level processes. So, the extent to 
which two distinct expressions share a common syntactic structure partly depends on 
the extent to which they were generated by means of the interaction of common lower 
level processes. Once generated an expression is subject to further processing as when 
an element is moved from one place to another in the expression. Once again, any such 
processing will have a lower level description. Just as the lower level causal processes 
implicated in the generation of an expression play a role in determining its fine grained 
syntactic structure, so do the lower level processes that it can in turn be subjected to. 
So, the extent to which two distinct expressions share a common syntactic structure 
partly depends on the extent to which they can be subjected to further common lower 
level processing. 
To talk in terms of states and processes that reside at a level lower than the linguistic is 
to leave unanswered the question of how such states and processes are to be described 
and individuated. This is not a question that one should expect the linguist to answer 
but there is no problem here. This is because it is commonplace for the scientist to 
develop theories whose truth-value is sensitive to facts concerning the nature of lower 
level phenomena the precise details of which the scientist is ignorant. for example, 
Mendel was able to make considerable progress in genetics long before the discovery 
of DNA.6 
5  This implies that there is a fundamental distinction between the language faculty and other systems whose be-
haviour might be said to accord with rules. for example, suppose that it were claimed that the behaviour of a planet 
accorded with a rule corresponding to Keplar’s law of planetary motion. This would provide no reason to think of 
the planet as representing that rule as its behaviour does not have any psychological description. The planet merely 
follows a particular elliptical trajectory whereas the language faculty is part of a complex system that understands 
and employs a language.
6  To account for rule representation in terms of lower level causal processes echoes the account of tacit knowl-
edge of the axioms of theories of meaning devised by Evans 98 and developed by Davies 987. In an important 
paper Wright (Wright 986) criticises this account. Whatever its power, I don’t think that Wright’s points have any 
direct bearings on my position due to salient differences between Chomsky’s project, on the one hand, and that of 
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4. Dealing with Quine and Kripke
How does the account of rule representation that I have been developing deal with the 
challenges generated by Quine and Kripke? Recall that Quine argued that numerous 
distinct yet extensionally equivalent grammars of English will fit the linguistic behav-
iour of an individual whose first language is English. In such a case, in contrast to 
the Danish children of his example, the English speaker is not guided by any particu-
lar grammar. The account of rule representation that I have developed deals with this 
problem in a straightforward way by suggesting that there is a real sense in which an 
individual’s linguistic behaviour is guided by a particular grammar. The correct gram-
mar is that of the competing extensionally equivalent grammars that corresponds to 
the lower level processing executed by the language faculty in the course of generating 
expressions. for example, suppose that there is a choice between a grammar containing 
a general head-first rule and one containing numerous more specific rules that together 
have the same implications for linguistic behaviour as the general rule. Then, if it is the 
case that all expressions conforming to the general rule are the product of the execution 
of a common lower level process by the language faculty, that fact will tell against the 
advocate of the latter grammar. If, on the other hand, there is no such commonality, 
then that fact would tell against the former grammar. Alternatively, suppose that two 
competing grammars consist of equally specific rules, but differ with respect to the 
syntactic structures that they assign to various expressions of an individual’s language. 
Once again, patterns of commonality and difference in lower level processing involved 
in the production of expressions and the further processing that the expressions can be 
subjected to may tell against one grammar and count in favour of its competitor. for 
example, suppose that grammar g assigns a particular structure to expression E and 
an analogous structure to E2 whereas grammar g2 assigns distinct structures to each 
of these sentences. Were it the case that a common lower level process was involved 
in the production of the expressions and that both expressions were subject to com-
mon further lower level processing, then that fact would undermine g2 and support g. 
However, were it the case that quite distinct lower level processes were involved in the 
production of the expressions and that the expressions were subject to quite different 
further lower level processing, then that would count for g2 and against g. In short, the 
nature of the lower level processes implicated in the generation and further processing 
of expressions determines which of the distinct yet extensionally equivalent grammars 
is true as an account of an individual’s language.
I now come to the problems generated by Kripke. Recall that Kripke argued that an ap-
peal to dispositions could not succeed in explaining how it is possible for an individual 
to grasp a determinate rule as, being finite creatures, our dispositions are finite whereas 
the demands of a rule are typically infinite. This threatens to undermine my account 
those philosophers who have engaged in the armchair project of constructing a theory of meaning, for example, 
Dummett 993 and Davidson 983. 
M. J. Cain  Confronting Philosophical Objections to Chomskyan Linguistics
1
of rule representation as that account requires that linguistic rules that have an infinite 
character fit the behaviour of the language faculty. 
The first element of my response to Kripke’s objection is to question the assumption 
that a finite creature cannot have infinite dispositions. The behaviour of plenty of fi-
nite physical systems are governed by laws of nature that are such as to imply that the 
system is disposed to behave in a distinctive way in each of infinitely many possible 
situations. for example, a particular body of gas that at this moment has a particular 
volume, temperature and pressure. The gas laws determine what volume the gas would 
occupy when subjected to any of infinitely many distinct pressures at any given tem-
perature. Hence, the laws imply that the gas has infinite dispositions with respect to the 
volume it occupies in response to pressures that it could be subjected to.
The case of laws governing the behaviour of finite systems can help defeat Kripke’s 
objection if there are appropriate laws governing the workings of the language faculty 
and here there are grounds for optimism. for one thing, Chomsky conceives of linguis-
tics as being a science, the science of the language faculty. Sciences typically uncover 
laws and construct explanations that appeal to such laws so that one might expect the 
enthusiast for the scientific status of Chomskyan linguistics to hold that the language 
faculty is governed by laws and that these laws directly correspond to linguistic rules. 
Moreover, the nativist commitments of Chomskyan linguistics suggests that we should 
think of rules in terms of laws. for Chomsky a characterisation of Universal grammar 
(Ug) describes the initial state of the language faculty, a state that places constraints 
on the mature states that the language faculty can assume and determines how the lan-
guage faculty develops in response to impoverished linguistic stimulation during the 
language acquisition period. As Ug is innate it is part of our biological endowment, an 
aspect of us that is genetically determined. This seems to imply that an accurate speci-
fication of Ug would capture a body of laws about the initial state of the language fac-
ulty and how its state changes in response to external stimulation. With respect to the 
mature state of the language faculty it seems to imply that there are laws governing the 
operation of that faculty when it is in any such state. for example, given that I was sub-
jected to expressions of a head first language when I was acquiring my first language, it 
is a law of the workings of my language faculty that it generates expressions that accord 
with the head first rule. In short then, there are reasons for thinking that linguistic rules 
are closely related to laws governing the workings of the language faculty so that the 
behaviour of that system has the required infinite character.
Suppose that it is accepted that law governed finite systems can have infinite disposi-
tions. There is still a problem as gases always behave in accord with the gas laws where-
as speakers of a language routinely violate the putative rules of their language. The 
language faculty is conceived as being connected to performance systems so that is 
operations are reflected in the linguistic behaviour of the individual. So, one might rea-
sonably ask, how can it be a law that the language faculty of individuals who encounter 
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head-first phrases as children acquiring their first language operates in such a way as 
to fit the head first rule? The answer to this question involves pointing that any such 
linguistic laws will, like all special science laws, be ceteris paribus laws (fodor 975; 
fodor 987; fodor 99). Ceteris paribus laws have exceptions; it can be a law that, 
ceteris paribus, As cause Bs, even though an A is sometimes tokened without causing a 
B to be tokened. At this point it will be helpful to give an account of the nature of ceteris 
paribus laws. The account that I favour is explicitly championed by Pietroski and Rey 
(Pietroski & Rey 995) and implicit in fodor (fodor 987). 
The natural world consists of many distinct systems. Any given special science will be 
concerned with the workings of one such system. The special scientist will conceive of 
her system as relatively self-contained and independent of all others and will attempt 
to uncover how it operates when free of external interference. When she states that a 
particular law holds she is making a claim about how the system of her concern works 
when free of external interference. But she recognises that in reality such interference 
does take place. Thus, she qualifies her statement of the laws governing the workings of 
the system in question with a ceteris paribus clause implying that any putative violation 
of the law constitutes a case where an external factor has interfered with the natural 
workings of the system. In such a case, the violation of the law can be explained by ap-
peal to the external interference. fodor presents an illustrative example (fodor 987). 
It is a geological law that, ceteris paribus, a meandering river erodes its outer bank. 
Examples of cases where a meandering river fails to erode its outer bank include those 
where the bank is concreted over, where the tiny abrasive particles are sieved from the 
water and so on, cases where some extra geological event has interfered with the work-
ings of the geological system. Such putative violations of the law can be explained by 
appeal to the interfering extra-geological event (for example, the river failed to erode 
its outer bank because the bank was concreted over).
This account of ceteris paribus laws suggests the following line of thought.7 Lingusitics 
is concerned with the workings of a distinct system of the natural world, namely the 
language faculty. The laws governing the workings of the language faculty are ceteris 
paribus laws so there can be exceptions to them. The cases where I produce a phrase 
where the head comes after its complement, where I misjudge the grammaticality of 
a sentence, where I am unable to deal with a long complex sentence, and so on, are 
cases where some interfering, extra linguistic factor prevents my language faculty from 
producing its natural effect. for example, my failure to process a long and complex 
sentence may be due to memory limitations of the system feeding input to the language 
faculty. My production of an ungrammatical sentence may be due to physical damage 
to the language faculty or a breakdown in the workings of an adjacent system such as 
the articulatory system. What some of these examples bring out is that the language 
7  This line of thought is inspired by Rey and Pietroski’s appeal to the nature of ceteris paribus laws in responding 
to Kripke’s critique of dispositionalism (Rey and Pietroski 995).
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faculty interacts with other in-head systems and requires the co-operation of these sys-
tems to ground our observable linguistic capacities. Consequently, the language faculty 
can lose its ability to ground such a capacity either as a result of its own breakdown or 
as a result of the breakdown of such adjacent systems. An example of the latter type of 
case would be that where damage due to a stroke prevents an individual’s articulatory 
system from responding to the language faculty. But in such a case, the putative viola-
tion of a linguistic law is due to, and can be explained in terms of, the occurrence of 
some extra linguistic phenomenon. 
It should be noted that there are cases where all else isn’t equal in the linguistic sphere 
which do not involve the interference of extra-linguistic factors. Suppose that it is a rule 
of English that the past tense form of a verb is the verb with -ed added to the end and, 
thus, that it is a law that the language faculty of English speakers adds -ed to the end of 
verbs to make their past tense forms. However, the past tense of ‘sleep’ is ‘slept’ and not 
‘sleeped.’ All else is not equal when I say ‘I slept well last night’ rather than ‘I sleeped 
well last night.’ But my behaviour in this case, though not constituting a genuine coun-
ter-example to the law, has a linguistic explanation. The explanation has to do with the 
lexicon, something that Chomsky describes “as a list of ‘exceptions’” (Chomsky 995, p. 
235). The lexical entry for ‘sleep’ will contain information about that item that is unique 
to it, for example that its past tense form is ‘slept.’ In contrast, the lexical entry for regu-
lar verbs such as ‘talk’ will contain no information concerning their past tense form. 
When I produce a sentence containing ‘slept’ and reject as ungrammatical one con-
taining ‘sleeped’ my so behaving is an interaction effect, the product of an interaction 
between a general rule and an atypical lexical entry that instructs the language faculty 
to treat the lexical item in question in a non-general way. Thus, the apparent counter-
example to the general rule or law – and why it is not a genuine counterexample – is to 
be explained by appeal to the lexicon and so is to be explained in linguistic terms. This 
example indicates another respect in which the linguist, like any special scientist, is 
engaged in a process of abstraction; for, she is trying to separate out the distinct factors 
that are involved in the occurrence of everyday phenomena that are typically interac-
tion effects. 
In sum then, there are good reasons for thinking that there are linguistic laws and that, 
despite our being finite creatures, the language faculty may well operate in a way that 
rules that have an infinite character fit. 
Kripke offers a second criticism of dispositionalism that, once again, needs to be dealt 
with. This has to do with normativity and runs as follows. Rules have a normative di-
mension in that they determine facts about how we ought or should behave. There is a 
gap between how we ought to behave and how we actually behave as we often do things 
that we ought not. By tying the demands of the rules that govern our behaviour to 
how we would behave in certain possible circumstances, the dispositionalist obliterates 
this distinction. She implies that whatever we do or would do is right or correct. But if 
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whatever we do or would do is right or correct then it makes no sense to talk of right 
and wrong or correct and incorrect and, thus, it makes no sense to talk of rules. Directly 
applied to my account of rule representation the objection is that laws of nature have to 
do with how a system – for example, the language faculty – does or would behave and 
that there is a distinction between this and how we ought to behave if we speak a rule 
governed language. 
My response is to question the centrality of normativity to rules.8 I do not wish to deny 
that there are facts to do with right and wrong, correct and incorrect, associated with 
many of the rules that philosophers have focussed their attention on. But such facts 
might well be grounded in facts concerning human social practises and psychological 
phenomena that need not be present in every case where rules are operative. Consider 
the example of the rules of chess. In teaching children how to play chess we typically 
explicitly state the rules of the game, encourage them to consciously consult the rules 
when deciding how to behave and aim to instil in them a respect for the rules and a 
desire to act in accord with them. When they violate the rules we criticise them and ad-
vise them to consider the rules and think again. And when we realise we have violated 
a rule we reproach ourselves, regret our actions and, even, feel shame. My suggestion is 
that normative facts surrounding chess are the products of such practices of teaching 
and evaluating and the desires, regrets and states of shame that they give rise to. Thus, 
in principle, such normative facts need not be present in all cases of rule governed be-
haviour. More specifically, they need not be present when our behaviour comes to be 
governed by a particular rule without any antecedent process akin to that involved in 
cases of learning the rules of chess. In the case of the rules that Chomsky envisages, the 
rules do not come to govern our behaviour as a result of such a process. The rules have 
a substantial innate basis and so there is no explicit instruction, criticism by appeal to 
statements of the rule and resultant desires, regrets, shame, and so on. In short, there 
is an explanation for the absence of normative facts surrounding linguistic rules such 
as the head-first rule and it is a mistake to generalise on the basis of a consideration of 
rules that come to govern our behaviour on the basis of a process of learning in a social 
context.
5. Wright’s objections
I will now turn my attention to a paper by Crispin Wright (Wright 989) in which 
he explicitly considers the impact of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations on 
Chomsky’s work.9 Wright suggests that the rule following considerations generate a 
8  Such a move is far from unprecedented. for example, Horwich argues that meaning isn’t inherently normative 
(Horwich 998).
9  See Wittgenstein 953, §§ 38-242 and Wittgenstein 967, particularly Part VI, §§5-49 and Part VII, §§ 47-
60).
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pair of related objections to Chomsky. The first runs as follows. Chomsky views the 
rules belonging to an individual’s language as a theoretical matter to be determined by 
reference to factors that the individual is not necessarily in the best position to deter-
mine. Consequently, Chomsky cannot make sense of a salient feature of language, the 
fact that language users have non-inferential knowledge of the rules of their language. 
Wright relates this objection to Dummett’s (Dummett 976) views on knowledge of 
language suggesting that he thinks that it is part of the concept of following a rule that 
the rule follower has such non-inferential knowledge.
The second objection draws upon Wittgenstein’s rejection of the idea that rules are infi-
nite rails whose demands are independent of the judgements of the rule follower whose 
task it is to track those rails. Rather, argues Wright, for Wittgenstein, the demands of a 
rule are bound up with the rule follower’s judgements in a manner that echoes the case 
of colour concepts. Our judgements of colour determine the extension of our colour 
concepts rather than reflect a pre-determined extension. Similarly, the demands of a 
given rule are related to our ‘best judgements’ as to those demands. Wright accuses 
Chomsky of endorsing this ‘rules as rails’ mythology as he portrays the demands of the 
rules of an individual’s language as being determined by a syntactic mechanism that 
settles which expressions of her language are well formed and which are not in advance 
of her making any grammaticality judgements.
I will consider these objections in reverse order. There is a respect in which, for Chom-
sky, the demands of an individual’s linguistic rules are determined by the state of her 
brain in advance of her making any judgements. However, this is not to say that there 
is no connection between those demands and the judgements that she would make, at 
least on the account of rule representation that I have developed. The state of my brain 
causally grounds facts about the grammaticality judgements I do make along with facts 
concerning the grammaticality judgements I would make in various possible circum-
stances. Were this link between my brain state and my judgements not to exist then the 
demands of the rules of my language would be other than what they are. So, it might be 
said that for Chomsky the demands of a rule are bound up with the individual’s judge-
ments. 
I take it that Wittgenstein’s target is Platonism. Now Chomsky is clearly not a Platonist 
as for him language is a psychological entity. Hence, when an individual makes a lin-
guistic judgement she is not making a judgement about anything existing indepen-
dently of her; she is not trying to track rails laid down in some Platonic heaven. This is 
why Chomsky (Chomsky 986; Chomsky 2000) insists that we mustn’t be mislead by 
the term ‘representation’ to think that the representations he talks about are representa-
tions of or about anything. 
Nevertheless, even though Chomsky is an opponent of Platonism his picture of linguis-
tic rules is at odds with that Wright seems to have in mind as that picture finds a sub-
stantial role for judgement in an ongoing process of shaping and settling the demands 
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of our rules. Whereas, for Chomsky, the demands of our linguistic rules are settled in 
advance of our making any judgements as to their demands. Now there is considerable 
plausibility in Wright’s view when applied to many of the most familiar rules that we 
follow. for example, think of rules governing the games that we invent. When we invent 
a game we need to lay down rules governing the behaviour of the game’s participants. 
Rarely can we envisage every situation that might be thrown up in the course of a game 
so we do not explicitly specify what the rules imply with respect to every such situation. 
Consequently, once we begin to play the game a contestant will occasionally behave in 
a manner whose legality is far from clear to the contestants, the referee and any specta-
tors. In response to such cases judgements are often made – sometimes there and then, 
sometimes subsequently – as to precisely what the rules demand in such situations. In 
this way an ongoing process of judgement can shape the precise demands of a rule. 
As portrayed by Chomsky, linguistic rules are not shaped by any such process of ongo-
ing judgement. Rather, the demands of any given rule are fixed prior to the individual’s 
actually making any judgements. However, there is nothing problematic about this as 
why there should be such a difference between linguistic rules and the rules governing 
games that we invent has a ready explanation. for, according to Chomsky, linguistic 
rules have a substantial innate dimension. Consequently, unlike the rules we self-con-
sciously invent, there is no need for any ongoing process of judgement to shape and 
determine the demands of the rule. In effect, the accusation is that Wright, noticing a 
prominent feature of certain rules, makes an illegitimate generalisation to the conclu-
sion that all rules have this feature.
A similar response can be made to Wright’s first objection. We do have non-inferential 
knowledge of many of the rules that we follow. But this doesn’t reflect a general fact 
about the nature of rules. Rather, it reflects a contingent fact about the manner in which 
we acquire mastery of many of the rules that we follow. The rules of chess are not in-
nate. On the contrary, the chess player has to learn them through a process of explana-
tion, deliberation, and correction. This process will often involve a conscious confron-
tation with a statement of the target rules as the learner is told what the rules are and 
reflects on such statements in her early attempts to play the game. Consequently, it is 
hardly surprising that the competent chess player has non-inferential knowledge of the 
rules of chess. As the rules that Chomsky postulates are innate rather than learnt, the 
acquisition process does not involve any such conscious confrontation with statements 
of the rule. Hence, it is no surprise that the individual finds it difficult to state the rules 
of her language. In sum, the accusation is that Wright once again makes an illegitimate 
generalisation on the basis of a consideration of learnt rules and fails to appreciate the 
significance of Chomsky’s nativism.
Both Kripke and Wright’s objections draw upon interpretations of Wittgenstein’s rule 
following considerations. This raises the general question of the relationship of the rule 
following considerations to the line of thought that I have developed. The rule follow-
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ing considerations are concerned with the question of how, if at all, it is possible for a 
particular rule to belong to an individual’s language. A key aim of Wittgenstein’s is to 
undermine mentalist attempts at answering this question as such attempts are either 
circular or lead to infinite regress. In other words, they are explanatorily bankrupt. If 
the account of rule representation that I have developed in this paper is viable then an 
important implication is that Wittgenstein has not undermined mentalist attempts to 
explain rule following per se. At best, he has only defeated the particular mentalist lines 
of thought that he considers, for example, the appeal to mental images and the appeal 
to interpretations. 
Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to defend Chomskyan linguistics against objections gen-
erated by the work of Quine, Kripke and Wright. I have done this by developing an 
account of rule representation that makes a crucial appeal to the lower level causal 
workings of a particular component of the mind/brain that plays a fundamental role in 
grounding our linguistic capacities. But what exactly is the status that I accord to this 
account? I should make it clear that I have not attempted to provide a constitutive ac-
count of rule representation, an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
rule to be represented in the mind/brain. Rather, my aim as been to give an account of 
one way in which determinate rules could be represented in the mind-brain that does 
not rule out the possibility that there are other ways in which determinate rules could 
be represented in the mind/brain. In other words, I have aimed to present a sufficient 
condition for rule representation rather than a necessary and sufficient condition.20 My 
account draws upon various elements of Chomsky’s core commitments. These include 
his modularity thesis, his view that the language faculty owes its status as such to its 
relations to other in-head systems, his goal that linguistics ultimately be incorporated 
into neuroscience, and his nativist conception of language acquisition. To that extent, 
my account is motivated by Chomsky’s work and is designed to be attractive to the 
Chomskyan. 
20  Cf. fodor’s approach to naturalising intentional content, fodor 990.
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